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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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# Memorandum

TO : CIA Records Administration Officer

DATE:

6 APR 1962

FROM : Chief, Administrative Staff, OL

SUBJECT: Inspector General's Report of Headquarters Courier System

REFERENCES: (a) Report to IG of Survey of Headquarters Courier System,  
dtd 29 Nov 1960(b) Memo to D/L fr CIA Records Administration Officer,  
dtd 13 Mar 1962, subject: "IG's Report of Headquarters Courier System"

1. As requested in reference "b", we are forwarding our comments on various recommendations made in reference "a", as follows:

a. Recommendation: When bulk deliveries are made such as RI pouches, the recipient usually signs the Courier Receipt without inventory of the contents. To provide better document control, it is recommended that a manifest-type receipt be prepared for the contents of RI pouches, and the courier insist on inventory and receipt at time of delivery.

Comment: While we recognize the desirability of such a system, it is considered to be impractical from the standpoint of time involved on the part of personnel to check the entire contents of each bulk delivery. Likewise, we see no difference between the practice of receipting for a bag of mail as opposed to the practice of receipting for an envelope which in turn contains several different mail items. In each case, the addressee is not sure of the contents until the bag or envelope is opened.

b. Recommendation: That an Agency handbook be prepared and published that would consolidate all official directives on the subject, and make it easier for clerical help to follow instructions by setting forth examples and illustrations.

Comment: It is our understanding that the Office of Security will assume primary responsibility for the preparation of such a handbook. The Office of Logistics will assist insofar as possible in its preparation.

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c. Recommendation: The Chief, OCR Liaison, prepare a memorandum for all agencies and departments with whom couriers make contact, requesting their cooperation in asking CIA couriers to identify themselves properly before turning classified materials over to them. All offices in CIA to be similarly notified and requested to ask couriers to show their courier's identification credentials.

Comment: It is our understanding that this has already been accomplished by OCR with respect to the Departments of Navy, Army, Air Force, and State. All couriers are equipped with appropriate identifications, to be shown upon request.

d. Recommendation: Instruct all couriers to: (1) Deliver classified material to the addressee or authorized-named representative only. (2) Request proper identification from all recipients prior to delivery of classified material. (3) Under no circumstances deliver classified material to unauthorized persons.

Comment: Couriers are instructed to deliver classified material to established registries, the personnel of which are recognized by the couriers. Tracking down individual addressees is an inefficient use of couriers, but is done upon specific request of the originator of highly sensitive documents.

e. Recommendation: Provide courier-drivers with a trip manifest or similar card to report times of arrival and departure at all facilities visited. Require supervisors to take daily readings of speedometer mileage as a check against the trip manifest.

Comment: Being done.

f. Recommendation: That the Office of Logistics and the Office of Security jointly investigate the feasibility and practicability of reducing the number of delivery points in the Pentagon (now numbering 30) by the establishment of a special center at the Pentagon to be manned by two or more Agency employees whose duties will include internal delivery and collections to these offices.

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Comment: We have been studying the advisability of requesting space at the Pentagon for such a center for some time. No conclusion has as yet been reached, inasmuch as the establishment of such a center does not reduce the number of central receiving points now serviced (38 points), but merely shifts the delivery responsibility, while tying up the complete services of two men. Part of the problem in reducing the 38 delivery points to a lesser number revolves around the fact that many Pentagon receiving points may receive only specific categories of classified documents. This remains a problem in which we are greatly interested and actively seeking solutions.

3. Recommendation: When a courier escort is not provided, all vehicles used by couriers will be equipped with [redacted] classified material while in transit. Wherever feasible, a two-way radio telephone should be installed in courier vehicles.

Comment: [redacted] four courier cars for use on longer trips (to AEC, NSA, etc.). [redacted] are not practical on city runs, inasmuch as the courier would be constantly [redacted] on relatively short runs around town. We feel that the attraction of attention and the consequent slowdown in courier operations makes this recommendation impractical. We are currently making a study of the use of radios in courier vehicles, and are actually using OCI radio-equipped vehicles on night runs.

2. We understand from [redacted] of your staff, that comments pertaining to other recommendations contained in reference "a" will be submitted by other components of the Agency.

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